Tuesday, May 3, 2011
None So Blind, by George W. Allen
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam, by George W. Allen
Ivan R. Dee, 2001
286 pages, plus index. No photos.
Library: 959.704 ALL
Description
From the first large-scale Viet Ming offensive against the French in 1950, to the fall of Saigon in 1975, the United States tried desperately to understand the nature of the fierce Communist-led struggle to create a unified, independent Vietnam. Even before its military involvement, and through the years of combat, American intelligence played a key role in gathering information on the political political and military situation in Vietnam and on the strengths and weaknesses of both sides.
But as George Allen shows in this eye-popping memoir, intelligence appraisals were consistently discounted, ignored, and rejected by policy-makers in every administration from Eisenhower through Nixon-because these assessments undermined the mistaken assumptions of the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon.
Few Americans knew more about the inner workings of Washington's Vietnam War policy over as long a period of time as George Allen did. A World War II navy veteran, he went to work as a Defense Department intelligence analyst after the war and later switched to the Central Intelligence Agency, where he served until his retirement in 1979.
He spent virtually all of that time in Vietnam and Washington, compiling firsthand intelligence on the French and American wars. From his unique vantage point, Mr. Allen reveals specifically how American leaders, unwilling to face up to "bad news" from intelligence sources, largely excluded intelligence appraisals from important policy deliberations until it was too late.
He names the names of those officials who refused to confront reality, who instead preferred to make their own strategic and tactical decisions, nearly all of which were doomed.
In its inside view, its recitation of facts, and its powerful argument, None So Blind is a remarkable contribution to the history of the Vietnam War.
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. A Taste of War
2. The French in Indochina
3. A Growing US Involvement
4. After the Geneva Accords
5. The View From Pearl Harbor
6. At the Center of Policy making
7. Politics in the Countryside
8. At the CIA
9. Assignment in Saigon
10. Escalation
11. The Public Opinion Campaign
12. Counting the Enemy
13. The Tet Surprise
14. The End of My Tunnel
15. The US Vietnam in Vietnam
Index
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